

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 003835

SIPDIS

NOFORN

FOR NEA/ARPI AND S/CT; NSC FOR TOWNSEND; LONDON FOR TSOU;
PARIS FOR ZEYA;

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2015
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV MARR PBTS EFIN ASEC CVIS KU TERRORISM
SUBJECT: KUWAIT COUNTERTERRORISM WORKING GROUP: GOK TAKING
STEPS TO IMPLEMENT CT STRATEGY TRAINING COMPONENT

REF: A. KUWAIT -- 3755 GOK OFFICIALS SAY IRAQ BORDER
DISPUTE RESOLVED
B. KUWAIT 3407 -- POSSIBLE ADVERSE PUBLICITY RE
EMBASSY KUWAIT REFUSAL OF NIV
APPLICATION OF NUBA M. R. A. B. ALENEZI
C. KUWAIT 3403 -- SENIOR KUWAITI MFA OFFICIAL'S
VIEWS ON GITMO
D. KUWAIT 3059 -- CWG: SLOW BUT RELATIVELY STEADY
PROGRESS ON CT
E. KUWAIT 2928 -- GITMO DETAINEE NASSER AL-MUTAIRI
ACQUITTED
F. KUWAIT 2438 -- REQUEST FOR EVALUATION OF
SECURITY INFORMATION: JIHADIST
PERPETRATORS TRIAL
G. KUWAIT 2265 -- CWG: SOME PROGRESS ON TERROR
FINANCE
H. KUWAIT 2118 -- (S/NF) REQUEST FOR IMMEDIATE
REVIEW OF VISA HITS: MP HASSAN JOWHAR
I. KUWAIT 1159 -- CWG: GOK TO USE TRAINING AS PART
OF ITS CT STRATEGY
J. KUWAIT 730 -- CWG MEETING

Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron

11. (S/NF) Summary: The Ambassador chaired on August 22 the monthly meeting of post's Counterterrorism Working Group (CWG). He reviewed his August 20 discussions with senior representatives of the GOK on the need to maintain a sharp focus on CT and recommendations that the arrests of wanted individuals would signal to the international community that Kuwait remained vigilant in the Global War on Terror. The officials stressed that CT was a government-wide priority and that Kuwait was looking at the big picture and not just individuals. Other sections reported that the GOK has not relaxed its focus on the need for more training and has turned to private companies and local experts for assistance. While post seeks to assist the GOK through FMS, ATA, and in-house training, we are encouraged that the GOK has identified and pursued other training opportunities. (Post's CWG is composed of the Ambassador, DCM, and section heads from CONS, ECON, DATT, RSO, OMC-K, POL, and SIMO.) End Summary.

Ambassador Stresses Need for Sustained Focus on CT

12. (C) During separate meetings on August 20 with First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior Shaykh Nawaf Al-Sabah, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Acting Under Secretary and International Organizations Department Director Ambassador Abdullah Al-Murad, and Council of Ministers Secretary General Abdullatif Al-Rodan, the Ambassador

SIPDIS
acknowledged Kuwait's continuing cooperation with the U.S. on counterterrorism efforts and stressed the importance of a government-wide, sustained focus on CT. Noting that terror financier Mohsen Al-Fadhli remained at large, the Ambassador told Shaykh Nawaf that his capture would send a strong message about Kuwait's commitment to the Global War on Terror. The Minister responded that the GOK was working hard to bring to justice both Al-Fadhli and Khaled Al-Dosari, and was optimistic that coordination within the GOK and with the U.S. would yield positive results. He cautioned, however, that the terror problem was greater than these two individuals and it was important to attack all fronts.

13. (C) Al-Murad informed the Ambassador that the steel pipeline barrier being installed along the border with Iraq (ref A) was one of the GOK's CT tools. There was serious concern about the possibility of insurgents crossing into Kuwait from Iraq and the GOK hoped a more secure border would help to stem their flow. He added that reforming the educational system to promote tolerance was a priority. (Note: The pipe barrier stands about three feet off the ground and will prevent vehicles from crossing. It is complemented by technical and physical surveillance of the border. End note.)

14. (C) Al-Rodan advised the Ambassador that the Council of

Ministers (COM) was considering approval of three treaties on terror: an Arab League agreement, a GCC pact, and the UN Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. Additionally, the COM was reviewing as a model the terror legislation adopted 28 July 2004 in the UAE. Al-Rodan said it was a "very good law" and could help the GOK to address terror finance and other types of support. He said the GOK also wanted to strengthen existing legislation to address conspiracy and intent. (Note: The UAE law defines terror and clearly outlines the penalties for terror finance, arms trafficking and training, and fomenting violence, issues not sufficiently addressed by Kuwaiti laws. Post would appreciate an assessment of the UAE laws and their enforcement in order to better engage the GOK on improvements to existing laws. End Note.)

Weak Laws Undermine State Security Efforts

15. (S/NF) Recently arrived SIMO Chief briefed the CWG on his initial calls on Kuwait State Security (KSS) officials. He reported that KSS indicated it would take a more aggressive approach to finding Al-Fadhli and Al-Dosari, but that its efforts were hampered by inadequate legislation. SIMO recently discussed current legal improvements with National Security Bureau President Shaykh Sabah Al-Khaled Al-Sabah, who critiqued existing laws as insufficient, but did not respond to an offer of assistance from SIMO. Despite the legal limitations, KSS was working hard to identify extremists in Kuwait and was conducting name checks for the Ministry of Defense in an attempt to root out hardliners from the military. SIMO Chief further noted that expanded cooperation with Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) elements in Iraq had revealed the possible presence of additional undesirable CT-related targets in Kuwait. Coordination between SIMO and JSOC in the region is excellent, and further targeting efforts will be pursued in this regard.

Promises of Detention and Prosecution of GITMO Detainees

16. (S/NF) PolChief briefed the CWG on the approved transfer of one Kuwaiti detained at Guantanamo and the review of four others for transfer. Post has asked the GOK for written assurances that the detainees would be incarcerated upon return, treated humanely, and prosecuted under Kuwaiti law. The GOK has given oral assurances that Kuwait will abide by all transfer conditions and repeated its request that all 11 detained Kuwaitis be returned (ref C). GOK officials added that Nasser Al-Mutairi, returned to Kuwait in January and acquitted in June, could still be retried, and remained under observation (ref E).

Terror Finance

17. (S/NF) EconChief advised the CWG that the GOK continued to make progress in dealing with money-laundering and terror finance. He welcomed planned visit by a team from Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control, commenting the visit would provide valuable opportunities to engage Foreign Ministry and Central Bank personnel on measures to eliminate funding for terror activities. In order to have a more focused dialogue with the GOK, SIMO will seek to identify specific cases where the GOK did not take the exact action requested by the U.S. in order to isolate the source of any failure and take corrective action. EconChief added that the arrival of a new U.S. Customs Law Enforcement Advisor, who has extensive experience in anti-money-laundering programs, would also help to bolster GOK anti-terror finance efforts.

Training Tops All

18. (C) RSO reported that Kuwait remained stable, but there was the possibility for terror incidents. GOK security staff wanted to do a good job, but had limited resources and training. The GOK has solicited special operations training from Blackwater for its SWAT and black operations teams, and welcomed continued Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) training from the U.S. (Note: Post has proposed the following ATA training programs for Kuwait: in FY 2006, Interdicting Terror Organizations-Advanced and VIP Protection MATT and in FY 2007, Critical Incident Management, Cyber-Consultation on Cyber Terrorism, Cyber-Incident Response Course, Cyber-Investigating Cyber Terrorism, Integrating CT Strategies at the National Level - Implementation, Integration CT Strategies at the National level - Polity, Interdicting Terrorism Organization - Advanced, Port and Harbor Security, Task Force Organization and Operations, and WMD Awareness. End Note.) RSO added that he has raised with GOK security officials the importance of protecting their critical infrastructure.

19. (S) OMC-K informed the group of its work with the

Preventative Security Directorate (PSD) -- a branch of the Ministry of Defense's J2 tasked to address counterterrorism, extremist groups, and external threats -- to identify training requirements. Courses under consideration include basic and advanced Foreign Military Sales (FMS) courses for intelligence officers and military police, and specialized courses available through FMS such as Intel Support to Counterterrorism and Security Officer Basic. Working with other agencies at post, OMC-K also hopes to provide specialized Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and specialized analysis training. The GOK was also being proactive regarding training and invited Kuwait Center for Strategic Studies President Dr. Sami Al-Faraj to lecture about the spread of terrorism and the need for a sustained, coordinated approach to fight terrorist organizations. He stressed the need for Kuwait's security and intelligence organs to work together, a message post has often delivered. His comments were well received and re-ignited interest in CT work, building on J2 plans to launch a campaign against extremism in the military. OMC-K is working with CENTCOM on the visit of a Mobile Training Team to assist with the campaign.

¶10. (S) In addition to training needs identified by RSO and OMC-K, the DATT recommended additional force protection training and a strengthening of the military's intelligence services. Not all training would need to be provided by the U.S.; Kuwait could also benefit from regional expertise. (Note: The UK has a long-standing training relationship with the Ministry of Interior. End note.)

Keeping Suspected Terrorists Out of the U.S.

¶11. (S/NF) The Consul updated the CWG on efforts to secure NIVs for Kuwaiti Members of Parliament suspected of having ties to violent organizations. MPs Waleed Al-Tabtabei and Awad Barrad Al-Enezi were recently approved for G visas to attend a UN parliamentary conference. MP Hassan Al-Jowhar's NIV application is still pending (ref H). He noted the complexity in having a name removed from the look-out system and advised the group that Shaykha Hessa Al-Sabah, daughter of the Crown Prince, had to be fingerprinted because of the presence of derogatory information. Nonetheless, the look-out system is an extremely useful tool and recently helped to identify a Kuwaiti applicant who, although she faces several charges for supporting terror activities, was approved by the Kuwaiti Ministry of Health for medical travel to the U.S. (refs B and F). Her medical history referred to vague traumatic experiences, omitting that her husband died after being captured by the police for being part of a terror cell that planned attacks on U.S. and Kuwaiti interests. Based on the contradictory information provided in her application, CONS has asked SIMO to brief interviewing officers on how to spot information that may link a visa applicant to a terrorist organization.

Visit Embassy Kuwait's Classified Website:
<http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/>

You can also access this site through the
State Department's Classified SIPRNET website

LEBARON